Articles - Journaltalk

I agree with Sutter and Pjesky’s observation. Their article brings to light a change that has occurred within the economics profession of slowly becoming a club exclusive to the profession (and hierarchical within). They also bring to light a more fundamental point about economics: Would Adam Smith want to publish in one of the top journals?

Adam Smith actively participated in public discourse. See Klein for a good discussion on public discourse in modern economics. There are few examples, if any, of a recent article in a top journal that is directed towards public discourse. Economists write for other economists.

Many of the great minds cited by Sutter and Pjesky such as Smith, the Mills, and Hayek also engaged in public discourse intended to reach audiences beyond the halls of academic economists. Smith would surely maintain open debate among scholars; he did so with Hume. Adam Smith would likely eschew publishing in a top journal. I think he would prefer to engage the public sphere outside the economics profession.

The economics profession, and society, would benefit from more economists engaging in public discourse. Sutter and Pjesky’s article opens the door for a discussion on the purpose of the profession.

“My worry is that our methods may be encouraging us to see human beings as pieces on a chessboard whose motions and working we purport to understand. This in turn makes us prone to become men and women of system, with an overconfident vision of what will serve to improve the well-being of the chessboard we are managing.

The religious view, and the Smithian view, of man encourages a humbler approach to human welfare. We are complicated creatures, we human beings. The road to improvement isn’t as well mapped as we might like to believe. Recognizing the complexity of human motivation should make economists, and others, more humble about their ability to intervene in private choices in a way that is welfare enhancing.”

I like this point, but I don’t think it’s our methods that encourage us to think we know what government interventions are good for people. Rather, that’s the default way of human thinking. It takes a couple years of economics training to get someone to realize that the price controls he thought increased human welfare don’t work out as he’d thought they would.

In a diverse society, however, religion can help with that too. If you are religious, it is impossible to pretend that everybody agrees as to the summum bonum. You can no longer say, “Well of course littering is immoral. Of course it’s better if people are free from guilt. Of course there’s nothing wrong with putting a sick old person out of their misery. Of course nobody should listen to Rush Limbaugh. Of course everybody should go to church. Of course someone should be allowed to smoke marijuana.” You have to argue about what the goals are, and you may develop more appreciation of compromise and healthy doubt as to whether it’s a good thing to allow the people who control the government to impose their own preferences as to these various issues.

In this article, the authors conclude that Adam Smith is a behavioral economist. They base this conclusion on a number of behavioral insights derived from the Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS). Mainly, they call on preferences, the dual-process framework of the passions and the impartial spectator, loss aversion, intertemporal choice, and overconfidence, as the clues connecting Smith with contemporary behavioral economics. Thus, they seem to believe that a pattern of people’s behavioral manifestations can be traced by economists through lab experiments, neuroscience research, etc., and, in this respect, Adam Smith’s theory of moral behavior provides important inspiration.

Contrary to Ashraf et al., I consider that in order to arrive to a more correct conclusion on Smith’s methodological position in the economic science, one has to look at both Smith’s behavioral insights in TMS, and his economic/cognitive insights in the Wealth of Nations (WN). The key is to realize that although Smith did dedicate an entire treatise to theorizing about human passions, his ulterior focus became people’s drive for economic improvement. Thus, in the WN he pursued the question on what are the circumstances propitious for the actions of the “the great mob(s) of mankind” to attain their passion for material well-being? Or, what environment helps people’s actions to converge, be compatible with one another, in spite of the other behavioral innate dimensions Smith evokes in TMS.

From this perspective, rather than being a behavioral economist, who resumes himself at attributing people’s behavior to their innate moral nature, Smith might well be seen an institutional economist (in the New Institutional Economics field), who’s works provide a basis for a closer inquiry into the social and legal norms which provide individuals with the framework of incentives that guide them to behave morally or immorally in their social and market interactions.

A fourth replication of the pattern was reported by us recently at https://bit.ly/roundedCornersPatternMetroPost, adding evidence to this replication effort.

With a sample of over 7.4 million users (vs. under 1,000 in the original study), the estimated lift was -0.07% (p-value 0.83), so consistent with the null hypothesis of no effect.

Diedre McCloskey writes in her essay, Adam Smith, The Last of the Former Virtue Ethicists, “The point is worth stressing here because Smith’s definite five virtues, and his emphasis on the joint cultivation of the five by the impartial spectator, puts him solidly in the older tradition of virtue ethics” (Page 56) McCloskey gave information on different primary virtues depending on social and religious background. She neglected to fully define what exactly a virtue ethicist is and this definition was assumed. My interpretation of the definition is an approach to logical principles or ethics from a moral analysis. Smith certainly takes this approach in Theory of Moral Sentiments however it may not be enough to fully define him as a virtue ethicist.

McCloskey briefly talked about Adam Smith’s view on utilitarianism and she stated that he opposed the concept it is unsure as to whether this is relevant because all virtue ethicists oppose utilitarianism or if it is specific to Smith.

The trouble that virtue ethics has is when analytic philosophers explore ethics; because their analysis is on a completely different spectrum than that of a moral philosopher. The main claim differs when they claim that it is essential to differentiate between the cognitive life and the values in life. In virtue ethics, McCloskey says incorporating the ethical objects of the self, of others, and of the transcendent is how one can conclude to an accurate interpretation of the virtue ethics. This is the most prominent and important reason why Smith is included in the former virtue ethicists. Smith’s contribution was the impartial spectator. This is not just the opinion of McCloskey but she says Smith believed this was his largest contribution as well. She says “The spectator is formed at first by upbringing and social pressure but at last evolves into a conscience—what was much later to be called ‘inner direction.’” (Page 52) The impartial spectator is more than just a conscience; this contribution from Smith was first introduced in Theory of Moral Sentiments and was a major part of why Smith is recognized as a virtue ethicist. The economist specializes in prudence whereas the theologian specializes in love, Smith incorporates both virtues and concludes with an all encompassed concept of the impartial spectator.

Smith’s five main virtues are courage, temperance, justice, prudence, and benevolence. The last section of McCloskey’s paper explains why Smith decided to not include hope and/or faith and most significantly, love. These virtues had a different connotation in that era and they were specifically used when speaking in religious terms. Smith never asserted his religious position in his novels and that is why it was so important when McCloskey concluded with this idea. He tried to not identify or affiliate with any religious concepts it seemed and maybe one of the best quotes of the paper is on page 68, McCloskey says “Adam Smith’s error was the error, and the glory, of the Enlightenment, trying to liberate us from transcendence”. It was not specific to Smith deciding to not delve into love, hope, and faith it was a characteristic of the time.

McCloskey’s analysis on why Smith is included as a former virtue is significant but definitely debatable. I would include Smith as a virtue ethicist because of his contribution with the impartial spectator but if you compare his work with the work of the other virtue ethicists such as, Aristotle or Plato the argument may not carry as much validity.