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Dissing "The Theory of Moral Sentiments": Twenty-Six Critics, from 1765 to 1949

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Author
  • Daniel B. Klein
Volume Number 15
Issue Number 2
Pages 201–254
File URL Dissing "The Theory of Moral Sentiments": Twenty-Six Critics, from 1765 to 1949
Publication year 2018

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Publisher INST SPONTANEOUS ORDER ECONOMICS
Grouping social sciences
Categories economic, economics

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4 comments

  1. Surely, many more “dissing” comments could have been included. It now occurs to me that I should have included the following from Jacob Viner’s “Adam Smith and Laissez-Faire,” JPE 1927:

    “I will endeavor to show that the Wealth of Nations was a better book because of its partial breach with the Theory of Moral Sentiments, and that it could not have remained, as it has, a living book were it not that in its methods of analysis, its basic assumptions, and its conclusions it abandoned the absolutism, the rigidity, the romanticism which characterize the earlier book.”

    The drift of Viner’s critical remarks are rather different than the dissing themes in the EJW piece. See notably Viner p. 216 (upper part of the page), and then p. 217 on TMS Ed. 6.

    posted 11 Jun 2018 by Daniel Klein

  2. I neglected to give page cite for the Viner quotation (“I will endeavor…”); it is p. 201.

    posted 11 Jun 2018 by Daniel Klein

  3. In the paper, after the ‘dissing’ quotations, I have a section ‘Circa 1800.’ I quote Popock and Melzer.

    I’ve lately read Wayne C. Booth, A Rhetoric of Irony (Chicago, 1974), fabulous. The book contains some passages apropos ‘Circa 1800’:

    “This is mainly a book about how we manage to share ironies and why we often do not; it is only secondarily a book of critical theory. I hope that it does, however, move toward some elementary theoretical clarity about a subject which has been—especially since the Romantic period—the mother of confusions. There is no agreement among critics about what irony is, and many would hold to the romantic claim…that its very spirit and value are violated by the effort to be clear about it.” (Booth 1974, ix)

    “The way irony works in uniting (or dividing) authors and readers has been relatively neglected since the latter part of the eighteenth century…” (ix)

    “It was not until well along into the eighteenth century that theorists were forced, by explosive developments in the use of irony itself, to begin thinking about ironic effects as somehow self-sufficient literary ends. And then of course irony burst its bonds so effectively that men finally dismissed merely functional ironies as not even ironic, or as self-evidently less artistic.” (139-140)

    “Even in the works I have selected to illustrate a functional, stable irony, I have often felt as if I were holding back a very frisky pony, that in fact the heady, threatening pleasures of irony were already trying to drag me ahead of my story—just as they ran away with literary history from the Romantic period on.” (175)

    “Traditionally, the capacity to make original metaphors was generally given much higher status than the ability to use irony; in Aristotle, for example, it is the most important single gift of the poet. But like irony, the device was not content until it had become a concept, an Idea. And with romanticism, it began to expand its domain, until it finally became for some the whole of the poetic art.” (177)

    posted 22 Jul 2018 by Daniel Klein

  4. I discover another passage from Dugald Stewart (1829) that should be included:

    “…Mr. Smith…has been led to resolve our sense of duty into a regard to the good opinion, and a desire to obtain the <i>sympathy</i> of our fellow creatures. I shall afterwards have occasion to examine the principal arguments he alleges in support of his conclusions. At present I shall only remark, that, although his theory may account for the desire which all men, both good and bad, have to <i>assume the appearance of virture</i>, it never can explain the origin of our notions of duty and moral obligation.” (pp. 37-38)

    posted 29 Jul 2018 by Daniel Klein

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