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1. Economic Enlightenment in Relation to College-going, Ideology, and Other Variables: A Zogby Survey of Americans

   • I enjoyed this article but I have a concern that the questions are not truly measuring “economic enlightenment”, but rather how readily individuals repeat the platitudes of their respective parties. A person who has little economic education could potentially appear to be economically enlightened simply by repeating the standard catch phrases of the Republican or Libertarian parties, without actually understanding the economic logic which makes their position correct. Is this person really enlightened?

     I agree with Mr. Potts that it is necessary to have some questions that would challenge the libertarian and conservative positions. Such questions might show that respondents answer correctly by and large when the answer conforms with their party’s standard phrasing.

     I may come to be a libertarian or conservative not through the process having thought through the results of various policies, but rather because I was born into a family that professed libertarian or conservative values. I may not know why rent control leads to housing shortages, I just know government intervention is bad (because that’s what I heard at the dinner table), and so I’m against rent control. This could explain the lack of correlation between enlightenment and education.

   • 5 comments
   • First comment 10 Jun 2010 by N. Joseph Potts
   • Last comment 25 Jan 2011 by John Stephens

2. Adam Smith, the Last of the Former Virtue Ethicists

   • In the opinion of Deirdre McCloskey Adam Smith was the last virtue ethicist. McCloskey bases this claim on the fact that in his Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith identifies five distinct virtues. Identifying a limited number of distinct virtues places Smith in contrast to some of the leading figures in enlightenment virtue projects, e.g. Kant and Bentham. In fact McCloskey believes that Smith’s conception and enumeration of the virtues is strikingly similar to that found in the work of Thomas Aquinas who identified seven.

     McCloskey rightly identifies that something is missing in Smith’s selection of the five virtues. Smith did not include two of the transcendent virtues, faith and hope, frequently found in medieval ethical systems. While McCloskey spends time speculating as to why Smith omitted faith and hope, it is important to put these virtues in context. McCloskey uses Aquinas as her source for the count of the virtues and it is important to look there to see if there is any particular order in which the virtues were ordered. In the Summa Theologica Aquinas says “faith is first among the virtues” (II-II q. 4 a. 7 s. c.). Further, he says, other virtues can only precede faith accidentally and those other virtues precede faith in the sense that they remove obstacles to faith.

     For Aquinas then there is a structure of the virtues that McCloskey seems to have completely missed. McCloskey attempts to explain Smith’s exclusion of the virtue of faith as an enlightenment era attitude against religion seems lacking. If McCloskey is trying to show Smith’s more ancient roots, she should also investigate the question of final causality that would have played an important part of any account of virtues for ethical writers like Aquinas. For those authors picking up from where Aristotle left off, there would have been some level of agreement concerning the final end of human action, or at least agreement that there is a final end for man that is part of his very nature. Smith, however, seems to have been influenced by his friend David Hume about the idea of causality—for Hume cause and effect is determined by proximity in time of the occurrence of events and there is as a result no final cause. If Smith accepted this then it is an easier explanation for rejecting faith then enlightenment religious sentiment as faith, for Aquinas, focused on the final end of man. That is, McCloskey skips out on the deep questions arising out of the virtue of faith and the structure it plays in the totality of the virtues as interpreted by Smith. She does this to the detriment of an otherwise interesting article.

   • 4 comments
   • First comment 22 Sep 2010 by Steve Kunath
   • Last comment 05 Oct 2010 by John Robinson

3. Advanced Placement Economics: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly

   • Oh yes, I should add that I teach principles of economics. And it has changed a lot… Just one example – the theory of growth is very different and more prominent in principles courses compared to 30 years ago. And I expect that most principles instructors have changed their treatment of this topic.

   • 4 comments
   • First comment 25 Jan 2011 by Paul Johnson
   • Last comment 16 Mar 2011 by David B

4. The Ideological Profile of Harvard University Press: Categorizing 494 Books Published 2000-2010

   • Quick question about cause and effect… I’m sympathetic to the argument here, and the social psychology literature demonstrates, quite well, that we read things more critically when they run counter to our own ideological perspectives, so clearly conservative books would have a more difficult time in the peer review process. However, I’m wondering if Harvard could defend its publication list by arguing that the number of conservative books published is actually proportional to the number of conservatives in academia. I’m noticing, for example, that some of the numbers here seem to mirror data about the number of conservatives in each discipline. So if field X is comprised of 10% conservatives, and 10% of HUP’s publications in that field fall right of center, couldn’t they argue that conservatives have the same chance of being published as liberals? Is there any way to see a sample of submissions and or rejections?
     April Kelly-Woessner

   • 4 comments
   • First comment 24 Jan 2011 by Hal Luft
   • Last comment 16 Feb 2011 by Milo Schield

5. The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with that of the Moderns

   • Constant’s speech discusses the tradeoffs that are imposed by the modern idea of individual liberty. In most representative governments today, individuals are left to make choices about how involved in the political process they chose to be. If Jack thinks that dedicating his afternoons to discussing policy is more costly than going to his job, he essentially outsources his political power—he votes (or chooses not to vote) and expects that his representative will act with similar interests to his own. The price that is paid for not censoring the public and not requiring full political participation (as was the practice of the liberty of the ancients) means that some people will, by choice, decide that their own private pursuits are more profitable. The profit Jack receives could simply be more time to spend engaging in discourse that is not political, it is not necessarily a monetary profit.

     The problem with trading political power for more individual liberty is that as more power is giving to legislators, they can exert more control over Jack’s individual pursuits, through regulation, taxation and other governmental controls. As an individual, he will find it more difficult to engage society in reforming these actions. A presumption of liberty needs to be maintained in the political sphere and also needs to be protected by legal rights of the individual. Otherwise, direct government involvement in the market process will begin to offset the betterment that Jack was pursuing in the first place by choosing a smaller amount of political power over his individual liberty.

   • 4 comments
   • First comment 15 Apr 2011 by Ariel Nerbovig
   • Last comment 06 May 2011 by Stephanie Myla Helmick

6. Preference Falsification in the Economics Profession

   • When I was a cadet in my senior year, we had to take a class with the senior officer in charge of the ROTC department. One of the concepts that I remember him trying to drive home was that we were preparing to enter a “profession”. At the time it struck me that he was grinding some sense of inadequacy, looking for a word that would make his own career more significant in the way some janitors want to be called “sanitary engineers”. However, two elements of his definition of a profession have remained with me (I’m sure there were more). In the colonel’s definition, a career field was a profession if it had a body of knowledge and an ethical code of conduct. Merely having an expert knowledge of a field made you a technician, not a professional. The ethical code of conduct instructed you on how you were to use your expert knowledge, and provided purpose for professional practice.

     In the quote above, Davis is referring to what the important work of the economics profession is, rather than what is important to be successful in the profession in this particular quote, but in an ideal world, the latter should flow from the former. I believe many people come to the social sciences with a desire to make society better (we may not all agree on what “better” means, but that is a separate issue). The dissatisfaction I read, overtly and between the lines, is that the “profession” of economics, in its pursuit of the air of positive science, has lost its ethical code of conduct and has devolved to a technical career field. The statement, “The economics profession is a bad joke. More and more economists are saying less and less to fewer and fewer people. And they conceal their vacuity in abstruse language and mathematical formulae” (p. 364), strikes at the heart of the loss of a professional ethic in the field. What is the ultimate purpose of economics but ultimately to increase society’s understanding of the economy and thereby guide policymakers to make effective policies? This does not necessarily mean that a lay person should be able to pick up an economics journal whose audience is intended to be professional economists and understand it fully any more than a lay person should be able to pick up a copy of the New England Journal of Medicine and expect to fully understand it. Every profession must have an introspective element that works to extend the professional knowledge, and a means of communicating that new professional knowledge.
     Davis paraphrases respondents who say collectively “The bifurcation of the economics profession into researchers, teachers, and policy-makers has gotten worse and the number of individuals who are respected for contributions in all three areas gotten fewer and farther between” (364). I am not sure this is actually a problem – it sounds like a matter of comparative advantage for the individuals involved. We are after all the field that promotes specialization of labor. The real problem seems to be that the economics field has been overwhelmed by its pursuit of the professional body of knowledge, and in particular a very narrow portion of the body of knowledge as defined by the use of mathematical methodology, and has lost its commitment to the ethic of betterment that defines social science practitioners as professionals rather than as mere technicians.

   • 3 comments
   • First comment 21 Apr 2010 by Jon Goldstein
   • Last comment 22 Apr 2010 by Shawn Reed

7. A Life among the Econ, Particularly at UCLA

   • On Bill Allen: One day, when I was an economics graduate student at UCLA, I was waiting for the Bunche Hall elevator. Prof. Allen was waiting as well. I didn’t know him, he had been on leave when I was an undergraduate. Waiting for the elevator, he was friendly and talkative. Afterwards, I asked someone who he was. When they told me he was an economics professor, I was surprised because he had been so friendly and nice!
     I enjoyed listening to the interview, thanks to all involved in putting it together.

   • 3 comments
   • First comment 08 Sep 2010 by morrie goldman
   • Last comment 17 May 2011 by josil

8. "The Two Faces of Adam Smith"

   • Vernon Smith seeks to solve the Adam Smith problem and reconcile what seem to be two inconsistent views of human nature in Wealth of Nations and The Theory of Moral Sentiments. In Wealth of Nations, Smith’s invisible hand theorem proposes that it is not from benevolence, but rather “the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another” which drives our behavior (1776; 1909: 19-20). In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith declares that there are “some principles in… [human] nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it” (1759; 1976: 9). Vernon Smith asserts that these two views are consistent if we recognize a “universal propensity for social exchange” (3). He proposes the following behavioral axiom: ““the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another,” where the objects of trade I will interpret to include not only goods, but also gifts, assistance, and favors out of sympathy, that is, “generosity, humanity, kindness, compassion, mutual friendship and esteem” (Smith 1759; 1976, p. 38)” (3). Vernon Smith then proceeds through historical, psychological, and experimental evidence to support this theory. Vernon Smith offers a very convincing and creative solution to the supposed Adam Smith problem. He makes crucial distinctions between reciprocated and non-reciprocated exchange. However, Vernon Smith seems to neglect the importance of non-reciprocated ethical behavior in Adam Smith’s work. Hanley (2010) elaborates on the distinctions between Adam Smith and Vernon Smith. He also points to divergences in opinion on intended beneficence and social vs. unsocial behavior. Vernon Smith asserts that Adam Smith’s explanation of beneficence is “utilitarian” and argues that it arises “from the expectation of reciprocal benefits” (17). This egoistic view of man may not fit neatly into Adam Smith’s conception which encompasses broader views on ethics and virtue.

   • 3 comments
   • First comment 25 Apr 2011 by Echo Keif
   • Last comment 06 May 2011 by Steve Kunath

9. Economic Enlightenment Revisited: New Results Again Find Little Relationship Between Education and Economic Enlightenment but Vitiate Prior Evidence of the Left Being Worse

   • I think many of the questions were worded in a way to elicit the wrong response. In a public policy discussion context I think there is an implicit “to a meaningful degree that in any way justifies the cost” modifier to be understood. If you add such a modifier appropriate to each question the answers become understandable. Conversely if you added “to any degree at all” or some such to each question I would guess you would get a different answer. People understand communication in context to make it make sense which results in their adding an impllicit modifier such as I mention.

   • 3 comments
   • First comment 17 May 2011 by rihir akidan
   • Last comment 28 Apr 2012 by Moshe

10. Individualism: True and False

    • Using the contrast between two philosophies that both have been referred to as individualism, Hayek outlines many of the usual justifications for a government and an economic system built around precepts of individual liberty. He tracks the intellectual history of the word “individualism”, claiming that what he calls false individualism leads inevitably to socialism and collectivism. He praises true individualism as worthy because it produces the most desirable results; false individualism has been wrongly associated with it and thus usurped its meaning.
      Hayek argues that the basic principle dividing the two philosophies is their differing conceptions of human nature. False individualism is more or less an overconfident humanism, while true individualism freely admits to human foibles and limitations. Thus, people who subscribe to false individualism have inflated expectations that men can rationally design the perfect society. Hayek argues for property rights, limited government, free exchange of goods and services, and the price mechanism built on the idea that men are fallible. The order in society develops unintentionally from the choices that free people make. Hayek’s defense of a classical liberal society on these grounds is utilitarian and compelling.
      It is somewhat surprising the particular battle lines Hayek drew. He equates true individualism with the Anglo-American culture and its associated thinkers, like Adam Smith and Hume, while pointing to French thinkers following in the tradition of Descartes as the primary source of false individualism. Hayek claims that German culture has yet another sense of the word individualism, which is the rejection of historical tradition as a source of authority over one’s behavior. It is an interesting division but a little difficult to believe that nationality follows the divisions between the intellectual traditions so simply.
      The most surprising point in the essay is Hayek’s effort to demonstrate that liberty and cultural traditions are consistently compatible. Cultural norms develop from a spontaneous order that reflects the process of the market. Hayek argues that respect for naturally evolving norms, rather than designed ones, encourages respect for the power of spontaneous order to produce the most desirable outcomes. His assertions seem to match the historical outcomes of the French Revolution, which ended with a military dictatorship, and the American Revolution, which resulted in a system of government with a strong presumption of liberty. The former tried to radically remake the society but the latter was simply an assertion of principles deeply ingrained culturally.

    • 2 comments
    • First comment 22 Sep 2010 by Tony Quain
    • Last comment 06 May 2011 by Stephanie Myla Helmick

11. Adam Smith and Conservative Economics

    • Here Emma Rothschild examines the various schools of interpretation of Adam Smith’s works that emerged shortly after his death. Specifically, she looks at three incidents where Smith’s ideas were used to support a particular policy or school of thought. Starting with the idea that Smith was, at least in a way, an indirect supporter of the French Revolution movement, she then discusses how an early biographer attempted to fundamentally redefine Smith’s understanding of freedom, Her final example shows how certain philosophers and statesmen in England attempted to confirm their own policies and positions by making reference to Smith and saying that his writings were in line with their policies.

      At this point an individual could justifiably ask what all the fuss is about. Does it really matter if Smith would have been a supporter of the French revolution, labor laws, or any other piece of trivia a historian is trying to suggest is important? They might continue and say that Smith opened up the door to modern economics and it is really not important to immerse oneself into the squabbles of the late 18th century. I answer, however, that it does matter and that Rothschild’s piece allows readers today to better understand the state of the world we now find ourselves in. Generally, when Adam Smith’s name is thrown around it is used to talk about the early development of the free market system and economics. If the average individual, and I daresay the average economist, is pressed to provide more details about who Adam Smith was and what his contributions were, they might make vague references to The Wealth of Nations and then completely skip over the career of Smith or even his earlier work on moral sentiments. The general lack of knowledge about Smith’s corpus or about even the general orientation of his work can lead to contradictory interpretations and is in the end what Rothschild’s essay points to.

      Economists, like individuals in many other fields, operate with many assumptions about how individuals operate. The modern turn has brought in primarily utility or Paretian ideas of maximization. While this move is justifiable at least from the perspective of making problems more tractable it fails to make a strong connection to the ideas of the individual that Smith would have assumed. Smith spilled much ink in the Theory of Moral Sentiments on the motivations and dispositions of the individual. Today there are, just like Rothschild’s examples, different schools of thought within the academy on how to correctly interpret Smith and apply his principles to current problems. The fact that these differences exist must be pointed out and once identified a real discussion must take place to understand what Smith is really saying, whether what Smith has said fits with our current knowledge, and only then can we really come to an understand of what liberty is and how it should be enshrined in our civilization. Rothschild’s essay provides a good first step in that direction.

    • 2 comments
    • First comment 07 Oct 2010 by Steve Kunath
    • Last comment 19 Oct 2010 by Brian Bedient

12. Is Economics Independent of Ethics?

    • The article provides a compelling case against the notion of separating positive and normative science in economics. High’s two examples address the concepts of coercion and property – both of which are commonly used in economic analysis, and both utterly empty without ethical content.

      The force of the piece is that High does not argue that economics ought not to ignore ethics, rather it cannot. The economist must take an ethical position when they talk about trade, because trade cannot occur without ownership, and ownership cannot be defined without ethics.

      Echo is right to suggest that High seems to be back pedaling when he ends his article with the suggestion that economists can remain value free. Certainly an economist can choose from a variety of ethical positions when they begin to do analysis, High chooses to differentiate between coercion and freedom by way of natural rights, but value-free analysis is not among the choice set. Perhaps High meant to say economics does not dictate any particular moral stance. Maybe so, but the important point remains that by beginning to do economic analysis, one has already chosen an ethical stand.

    • 2 comments
    • First comment 15 Apr 2011 by Echo Keif
    • Last comment 22 Apr 2011 by John Robinson

13. Adam Smith and the role of the state: education as a public service

    • Skinner points out that people who support a more interventionist government policy would cite Smith for his mention of the government’s involvement in social diversions. It is important to note that Smith says nothing about the state creating institutions or subsidizing in his discussion of pubic diversions. His suggestion that the government should encourage diversions by giving entire liberty to the people means that those people should be free to do what they want, within the confines of their liberty. The state does not encourage exercising liberty by granting subsidies; it encourages exercising liberty by not putting up barriers to its existence.

      The problem with a government body effectively “stepping into” the market in order to correct an efficiency problem is that efficiency is not a static concept. In its application towards education, government policy needs to set up certain standards that will show how close a school, teacher or university is to a given level of efficiency. The level of efficiency is arbitrarily set by experts who will weigh in on where students should be in their educational path, based on gender, age, nationality, family income, and a myriad of other variables. When Smith suggested that the government needed to ensure efficiency, it meant that the government needed to make sure that the opportunity for education was available to each person who desired it, not that the government necessarily had to intervene in the curriculum.

    • 2 comments
    • First comment 22 Apr 2011 by Ariel Nerbovig
    • Last comment 24 Apr 2011 by Brandon Holmes

14. The Social Science Citation Index: A Black Box—with an Ideological Bias?

    • After a Google keyword search of “Commentary Magazine” and “Social Science Citation Index,” I found this article and was introduced to EJW. The bias Klein and Chiang illuminate, exists not only in the slant of the SSCI journals which make and break careers, but also the themes and questions addressed at major conferences and their panels. (Just take a look at the CfP for next year’s APSA annual.) Now finishing up a PhD and finding the same problem on the job market, the research backgrounds often asked for (my area is IR/ IPE) also come from left field. Rather than become disheartened, this state of affairs increases my resolve to follow and intelligently express my conservative convictions in the face of single minded institutionalized opposition. I love a good fight and know the truth will prevail. I’d rather be right than loved, although it would be nice to be both.

    • 1 comments
    • First comment 01 Nov 2011 by Alex Littlefield
    • Last comment 01 Nov 2011 by Alex Littlefield

15. From Friedman to Wittman: The Transformation of Chicago and Political Economy

    • Caplan offers a balanced and even favorable description of Wittman’s argument in “Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results” (1989). Wittman objects to most of the public choice literature because it assumes extreme voter stupidity. Instead of assuming voters are ignorant, critics of the government are actually assuming that voters are systematically biased in their beliefs. Wittmann also points out that voters are not as gullible as public choice theorists assume. They use parties like brand labels, which make the voting problem much easier than it might appear. Wittman is also skeptical about complaints of a lack of political competition. He points out that very few unpopular policies persevere because unpopular policies lose votes. Furthermore, incumbents are reelected because they are better than the competition. Wittman finally points out that democracy lowers negotiation and transfer costs.

      Caplan perceptively points out that Wittman’s position is valid, but not sound. While his assumptions lead to his conclusion that democracy is efficient, he commits a fatal flaw by assuming that voters are rational. Caplan’s work in economic beliefs and the systematic bias that exists among non-economists and the less educated weakens the validity of this assumption. Caplan’s theory of rational irrationality, that people are more irrationality when the cost goes down, seems to be the nail in the coffin for Wittman’s theory. Rational public opinion is in fact a public good. Adam Smith had it right when he asserted that perverse policies were the result of systematically biased beliefs.

      The most important message from this article is that empirical testing is necessary for good theory. We cannot assume that voters are rational without testing if that is really the case. Economists must move beyond blackboards and untested behavioral assumptions if we are to make any real progress in our field. Caplan is a brilliant example of this philosophy.

    • 1 comments
    • First comment 11 Mar 2011 by Echo Keif
    • Last comment 11 Mar 2011 by Echo Keif

16. The Problem of Social Cost

    • “When an economist is comparing alternative social arrangements, the proper procedure is to compare the total social product yielded by these different arrangements. The comparison of private and social products is neither here nor there.” (p.34)

      These two sentences are charged with a number of points. First, can we measure total social product? Second, is it true that comparing private and social products is “neither here nor there”?

      Coase’s injunction that economists must compare total social product resulting from different arrangements of property rights presumes that economists can in fact do this. Unlike his zero-transaction cost assumption, I think he actually means this to happen in the real world – this is in fact the real work of economists in his mind. The problem is that arriving at net social product is so laden with transaction costs that it is impossible to do, just like Hayek’s argument about social calculation of prices. One can make gross calculations and assumptions about the real social costs of particular property rights arrangements to individual actors at a given time, but these will never arrive at the true social costs because discovering all the ramifications of even seemingly innocuous assignments of rights can have far-reaching, unseen consequences in a connected economy.

      Coase argues in this paper: “It is always possible to modify by transactions on the market the initial legal delimitation of rights” and those transactions would always take place if they were costless and “lead to an increase in the value of production” (p. 15). Since transaction costs are not in fact costless, we know that their existence eliminates many transactions. Negotiating with many rights holders for access to a water source for example may prove too high due to transaction costs, even if the actual cost of purchasing the rights might not be that high.

      Furthermore, it is not always possible to engage in market transactions after an initial delimitation of rights because part of the delimitation of rights may include non-transferability (inalienability). For example, I have the right to vote, but my right to vote is non-transferable – I cannot use the market to arrive at a higher social product. I may be better off if I could sell my vote, since at the margin it is relatively worthless.

      The argument that private product does not matter, and only social product matters is a strict utilitarian argument and does not proceed from any lasting or predictable principle. This provides little or no guidance to government actors on how to make allocations of rights. Some violations of private product may appear to result in an increase in social product (which is, again, virtually impossible to measure), but are repugnant to our values as individuals.

      This is a very interesting article that has a lot to teach us, but I think its flaws hinge on the assumption that we can rebuild a philosophical framework from the point of zero-transaction costs, even if we acknowledge that this assumption is strictly a means of getting at the underlying issues.

    • 1 comments
    • First comment 22 Apr 2010 by Mark Bonica
    • Last comment 22 Apr 2010 by Mark Bonica

17. Do Economists Reach a Conclusion on Subsidies for Sports Franchises, Stadiums, and Mega-Events?

    • Hello Mr Brad R Humphreys and Mr Dennis Coates. my name is Rizky. You can call me Rizky. i am undergraduate student at Departement of economics-Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta province-Indonesia.

      Mr, i am very interested with your journals. Your journals really inspired me to write the same things related to soccer (football) in Indonesia. football research in Indonesia very rare, especially describing the relationship football and economy. i want it is used for my thesis and i hopefully be useful to progress football in Indonesia.

      Mr, I have many questions. what motivates you to write and interest about the economics of sport?

      maybe this is my first question. I hope to discuss with you a lot. thanks a lot for your attention. nice to meet you Mr

      Best Regards

      Rizky F

    • 1 comments
    • First comment 19 Jan 2011 by rizky
    • Last comment 19 Jan 2011 by rizky

18. Gulphs in Mankind’s Career of Prosperity: A Critique of Adam Smith on Interest Rate Restrictions

    • In the excerpts from letters Bentham wrote to Smith, Bentham takes to task Smith’s belief that rates of interest should be capped to prevent usury. Approaching his former teacher with repeatedly expressed respect, Bentham uses many of Smith’s own beliefs and arguments to attempt to persuade Smith to recant his defense of usury laws. In pointing out that capping interest chokes off financing possibilities for projectors, Bentham’s pleas to Smith are a brilliant early defense of what we now call entrepreneurs.

      Smith never revised the section of Wealth of Nations that covers usury or his views on projectors; though one historical account shows that Smith essentially admitted in private that Bentham was correct. In the editor’s preface Dan Klein says he fancies the idea that Smith’s awareness of his own cultural status in Scottish society and desire to protect it prevented him from attacking usury. Klein also speculates that “Smith was telling Bentham that we do not want to unbridle ambition and proud genius, because of the frightful hazards of unleashing them in the governmental realm.”

      If Smith understood the value and importance of the projector (entrepreneur), why couldn’t he have revised Wealth of Nations to defend the projector—even if he maintained his defense of usury laws? Smith could have used his influence to carve out a legitimate place for projectors, and their projects, and left the task of going after usury laws to Bentham and others (as ultimately happened). Klein notes that some have considered Bentham’s essay the “beginning of the modern world.” If the defense of the projector is of this great importance, and Smith realized it, why would he leave his censure of projectors intact in the final version of Wealth of Nations? Despite Klein’s defense, it still makes sense to ask whether Smith had a sufficient enough understanding of the importance of projectors for economic growth and human betterment.

    • 1 comments
    • First comment 11 Mar 2011 by Brandon W. Holmes
    • Last comment 11 Mar 2011 by Brandon W. Holmes

19. Where Would Adam Smith Publish Today? The Near Absence of Math-free Research in Top Journals

    • I agree with Sutter and Pjesky’s observation. Their article brings to light a change that has occurred within the economics profession of slowly becoming a club exclusive to the profession (and hierarchical within). They also bring to light a more fundamental point about economics: Would Adam Smith want to publish in one of the top journals?

      Adam Smith actively participated in public discourse. See Klein for a good discussion on public discourse in modern economics. There are few examples, if any, of a recent article in a top journal that is directed towards public discourse. Economists write for other economists.

      Many of the great minds cited by Sutter and Pjesky such as Smith, the Mills, and Hayek also engaged in public discourse intended to reach audiences beyond the halls of academic economists. Smith would surely maintain open debate among scholars; he did so with Hume. Adam Smith would likely eschew publishing in a top journal. I think he would prefer to engage the public sphere outside the economics profession.

      The economics profession, and society, would benefit from more economists engaging in public discourse. Sutter and Pjesky’s article opens the door for a discussion on the purpose of the profession.

    • 1 comments
    • First comment 22 Apr 2010 by Jonathon Diesel
    • Last comment 22 Apr 2010 by Jonathon Diesel

20. The Role of Economists in Ending the Draft

    • Great article. I enjoyed reading it. Especially the declaration of economists against the draft …… really nice!

      I am writing a paper against the draft in Austria and found it very useful.
      The situation in Austria is such, that the laws that constitute the draft are even used to legitimize a compulsory civil service. This service is theoretically limited to those who are morally unable to serve with the weapon but has reached a volume of almost 50 % of the draftees. Naturally the labor marked is distorted and the private and public companies that are using the free labour are using their influence to secure their benefits.

      This article showed how this conflict can be won. Thanks….
      Johannes

    • 1 comments
    • First comment 21 Feb 2011 by Johannes Hoyos
    • Last comment 21 Feb 2011 by Johannes Hoyos