Journaltalk - Adam Smith, The Last of the Former Virtue Ethicists

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1. Diedre McCloskey writes in her essay, Adam Smith, The Last of the Former Virtue Ethicists, “The point is worth stressing here because Smith’s definite five virtues, and his emphasis on the joint cultivation of the five by the impartial spectator, puts him solidly in the older tradition of virtue ethics” (Page 56) McCloskey gave information on different primary virtues depending on social and religious background. She neglected to fully define what exactly a virtue ethicist is and this definition was assumed. My interpretation of the definition is an approach to logical principles or ethics from a moral analysis. Smith certainly takes this approach in Theory of Moral Sentiments however it may not be enough to fully define him as a virtue ethicist.
   McCloskey briefly talked about Adam Smith’s view on utilitarianism and she stated that he opposed the concept it is unsure as to whether this is relevant because all virtue ethicists oppose utilitarianism or if it is specific to Smith.
   The trouble that virtue ethics has is when analytic philosophers explore ethics; because their analysis is on a completely different spectrum than that of a moral philosopher. The main claim differs when they claim that it is essential to differentiate between the cognitive life and the values in life. In virtue ethics, McCloskey says incorporating the ethical objects of the self, of others, and of the transcendent is how one can conclude to an accurate interpretation of the virtue ethics. This is the most prominent and important reason why Smith is included in the former virtue ethicists. Smith’s contribution was the impartial spectator. This is not just the opinion of McCloskey but she says Smith believed this was his largest contribution as well. She says “The spectator is formed at first by upbringing and social pressure but at last evolves into a conscience—what was much later to be called ‘inner direction.’” (Page 52) The impartial spectator is more than just a conscience; this contribution from Smith was first introduced in Theory of Moral Sentiments and was a major part of why Smith is recognized as a virtue ethicist. The economist specializes in prudence whereas the theologian specializes in love, Smith incorporates both virtues and concludes with an all encompassed concept of the impartial spectator.
   Smith’s five main virtues are courage, temperance, justice, prudence, and benevolence. The last section of McCloskey’s paper explains why Smith decided to not include hope and/or faith and most significantly, love. These virtues had a different connotation in that era and they were specifically used when speaking in religious terms. Smith never asserted his religious position in his novels and that is why it was so important when McCloskey concluded with this idea. He tried to not identify or affiliate with any religious concepts it seemed and maybe one of the best quotes of the paper is on page 68, McCloskey says “Adam Smith’s error was the error, and the glory, of the Enlightenment, trying to liberate us from transcendence”. It was not specific to Smith deciding to not delve into love, hope, and faith it was a characteristic of the time.
   McCloskey’s analysis on why Smith is included as a former virtue is significant but definitely debatable. I would include Smith as a virtue ethicist because of his contribution with the impartial spectator but if you compare his work with the work of the other virtue ethicists such as, Aristotle or Plato the argument may not carry as much validity.

   posted 16 Oct 2011 by Rachel Ellis